Displacement, Development, and Climate Change

International organizations moving beyond their mandates

Nina Hall

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To Trish and Philip

Contents

IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PICMME	Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
UN	United Nations
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNCBD	UN Convention on Biological Diversity
UNCED	Rio United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UN-REDD	United Nations Reductions of Emissions due to Deforestation and forest Degradation
UNU	United Nations University
UNU-EHS	United Nations University, Institute of Environmental and Human Security
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

- **Theorizing mandate change in international organizations**
- **Studying mandate change**
- **Research design**
- **Structure of the book**
- **Conclusion**

In 1951 in Geneva, at the heart of Europe recovering from a devastating war, states negotiated the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a landmark agreement which offered protection to those forced to flee across borders due to persecution. States tasked the newly created United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with overseeing and supervising this convention. A small office was established in Geneva for international refugee lawyers to advise states and ensure refugee law was adhered to. In that same year, states established another new international organization: the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME). Its purpose was to organize the relocation of thousands of labor migrants from post-war Europe to the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand. To perform these tasks PICMME had a fleet of ships and officers with experience in the mass movement of migrants across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. These two organizations were just the tip of the iceberg of a growing population of intergovernmental organizations, created in the aftermath of World War II.

Fast forward more than sixty years and these two organizations, along with many others, still exist. Yet the world has changed dramatically and the problems they were initially established to address are no longer the same. A globalized and interconnected world has brought new challenges ranging from the global financial crisis to climate change. Many intergovernmental organizations were established on the premise that global challenges could be siloed into discrete issue-areas such as migration, health, and trade. But today the issues are seen as so interdependent that we can no longer address one issue without also targeting many others. Humanitarian crises, for instance, are intertwined with issues such as food security, development, climate change, and gender equality. Given this changing international context, how are intergovernmental institutions established in the post–World War II era adapting?

This book focuses on one critical new challenge: climate change. Climate change is predicted to lead to an increased intensity and frequency of natural disasters from droughts to floods and higher sea-levels. Its impacts are already being felt and seen across the globe: from extreme weather events, such as the cyclone which destroyed much of Vanuatu in 2014, to intense and prolonged droughts in the horn of Africa. In addition, an increase in extreme weather events and higher sea levels may lead to displacement and migration.[1] As global temperatures rise this affects many dimensions of the economy and society, from agriculture to public health. Climate change is also a challenge to the existing development paradigm—development organizations should be promoting sustainable, green growth rather than following the fossil fuel intensive industrialization model of the west.[2] Development actors must also enable countries to adapt and prepare for the likely increase in slow-onset and fast-onset disasters.[3]

Climate change also has dramatic effects on developed countries as can be seen from the powerful hurricanes hitting New Orleans and the subsequent flooding, the heat waves that now regularly feature in European summers, and the destructive bush-fire seasons in Australia. But these countries have the resources to cope, whereas developing countries most often do not.

In the past decade many international organizations have highlighted the disastrous effects of climate change on developing countries. Many organizations, from Greenpeace to Oxfam, highlighted how climate change may lead to climate change "refugees" (a popular but legally incorrect term, as will be discussed in this book) as people are forced to flee their homes. The media also picked up on the stories of low-lying islands, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu in the Pacific, which would be inundated by a sea-level rise of several meters. People living in delta areas, particularly in Bangladesh, are also at risk of flooding. Many feared that climate change would drive millions from their homes—displaced by flooding, storms, droughts, or sea-level rise.[4] Concerned civil society organizations, academics, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) argued for new international protection frameworks to cover those forced to move due to climate change.[5] Although a large

literature has emerged examining the links between climate change, migration, and displacement (and will be discussed in Chapter 2) there has been little examination of how existing development, migration, and refugee organizations have adapted to the new reality of climate change. Are they able to assist those worst affected by climate change—be they "climate change migrants," climate refugees, or those left behind—within their existing operations and activities?

In fact, we know relatively little about how international development, migration, and humanitarian organizations are responding to climate change. Global environmental governance scholars have focused on global environmental organizations and how they are responding to climate change. They have also explored the increasing complexity and fragmentation of the climate regime as it broadens to include a range of new issues and new actors from NGOs to interest groups and intergovernmental organizations.[6] They have identified why international organizations may "band-wagon" on the climate regime.[7] They have pointed out the benefits institutions can gain, in particular new material and ideational resources, and the role that secretariats play in managing regime interplays.[8] However scholars have not sufficiently examined how existing *non-environmental* institutions are adapting to climate change and what impact this is having on their mandates. Are they moving beyond their mandates?

This book focuses on three institutions: the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It asks: How have these intergovernmental organizations responded to climate change? And how can we explain variation in their responses? These three institutions have a leading role to play in assisting developing countries, who are predicted to be the most vulnerable to climate change. This is particularly important as there is no new global "adaptation" organization tasked with helping developing countries prepare for and deal with the impacts of climate change. In fact, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General has argued adaptation should be included in the work of all UN agencies and programs and it is thus imperative to understand if and how they have done so.

In addition, it is important to understand how these three existing organizations are adapting because states rarely create new institutions, or disestablish old ones.[9] Given that organizational change can vary from the ad-hoc and superficial to the sustainable or transformative, we need to ask what sorts of changes are occurring and why. Demands for transformations in global governance often overlook the value of a degree of inertia. If our international organizations were to constantly change their mandates and tasks they would be unable to deliver effectively in areas where they hold expertise. Change may mean neglecting, or even abandoning, tasks they were originally designed to do. International organizations have to walk a tightrope between stasis and change. There are thus wider implications of this research: When and what sort of institutional change should we advocate for?

This book's central argument is that international bureaucrats can play a decisive role in mandate expansion. They often decide whether and how to expand into a new issue-area and then lobby states to endorse this expansion. In particular, staff of international organizations make changes in rhetoric, policy, structure, and operations on the ground. Through these actions they forge, frame, and internalize new issue-linkages and use these to advocate for expansion. The core contribution of this book is untangling how international organizations see and adapt their mandate to a changing external environment, when states do not give them clear direction.

Theorizing mandate change in international organizations

This book is in conversation with a long-standing international relations debate on the autonomy and influence of international organizations. Much of the literature takes a statist view—that states determine whether to "Use, Select, Change or Create" institutions to deal with new issues.[10] In contrast, other recent scholarship has emphasized the role of international bureaucrats in creating institutions and shaping regime overlaps.[11] This book contributes to these contemporary debates by illustrating how international organizations can lobby states to expand their mandates and even bypass states' approval. Mandates are set by a collective of states, who govern and finance these institutions. Yet states do not typically delegate every task or action, but rather expect an organization to use its expertise and respond to new issues autonomously. In addition, international organizations have some wiggle room: the exact parameters of a mandate are often ambiguous.[12] International organizations can exploit differences between states over what an organization should or should not do. Thus an organization may extend the limits of its mandate by engaging with a new issue, and lobbying states to support this expansion officially.

In doing so, this book builds on and contrasts with the work of principal agent scholars. Principal agent theory starts from the assumption that states (principals) create intergovernmental organizations (agents) to perform particular tasks on their behalf. These agents offer specialized expertise and services which would be costly for any one principal to

provide.[13] International organizations may also enable cooperation by: facilitating collective decision making, resolving disputes, and enhancing credibility of decisions by locking in particular policies.[14] Although states delegate international organizations limited autonomy to perform these tasks, these institutions can only go so far beyond, or against, state interests as they will lose financial and political support. According to this account organizational expansion occurs either if states delegate a new task to an international organization (delegation) or if an organization strays off its delegated mandate into a new area, so-called "agency slack."

The principal agent literature is concerned by agency slack, and sees it as a problem to be constrained. Scholars have identified how states monitor international organizations and ensure they do not stray too far from their mandate. They have shown how the degree of discretion delegated, proximity of member state preferences, heterogeneous principal preferences, voting structures, asymmetry of information, and the costs of monitoring, explain why one organization will expand and another does not.[15] Principals can also use a number of control mechanisms to ensure organizations do not engage in agency slack. They may simply delegate little discretion to the agent.[16] They may also monitor and enforce reporting requirements through "police patrols" or "fire alarm" oversights.[17] States may establish institutional checks or sanction an institution by controlling the budget, staff appointments, and overriding agency behavior through new legislation. These control mechanisms enable principals to ensure compliance with their preferences, but may be costly to implement. States face a trade-off between the costs of monitoring and perceived agency losses. A principal may find monitoring an agent too costly and/or be ineffective at controlling an agent.[18] Thus an agent will gain greater slack if its principals decide not to—or cannot—effectively control it.

These are all useful insights; however they do not examine how mandate evolution may occur over time as a result of persistent lobbying by bureaucrats of international organizations. I acknowledge that states set important parameters of action for international organizations—after all only they can stipulate the founding mandate of an international organization. However, international organizations are not completely restricted by their member states. They may choose to expand into new issue-areas even if states are not supportive and actively voice their dissent. Thus we may see an organization gaining greater scope, and taking on a range of new issues, without any collective agreement from states.

In addition, this book highlights two factors which shape whether and how an international organization responds to a new issue-area: issue-linkages and staff perception of their mandate. Essentially, it proposes that organizational expansion is most likely to occur when staff perceive a new issue to link strongly to their organizational mandate. It builds on international relations scholarship emphasizing the role of international bureaucracies, staff, and leaders in organizational change.[19] Let's look at these two claims in turn and how they build on and contribute to existing scholarship.

Issue-linkages

An organization's decision to engage with a new issue depends firstly on the nature of that issue, and how relevant it is to its mandate. Twenty-five years ago it would have seemed odd for an international humanitarian organization to engage in debates over how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. The catch is that issues evolve in complexity as we become increasingly aware of how they impact on other issues—and climate change is now seen to impact a huge number of areas, including issues of direct consequence to humanitarian and development organizations. It is often classified as a "wicked" problem, an issue which is inherently difficult to resolve because of its complexity and interdependency with other issues.

The question of if and when one issue "spills over" and becomes relevant to other regimes is a central concern for scholars of regimes and international organizations. There are many examples of, and a growing literature on, emerging issue-linkages that bridge distinct regimes such as: development and migration,[20] gender and security,[21] or trade and environment.[22] One shortcoming of the existing literature is that it does not examine the strength of these issue-linkages.[23] I propose that the more widely accepted, or perceived, an issue-linkage is the stronger it is.

Importantly, I distinguish between substantive and tactical issue-linkages. A substantive issue-linkage is a "real or perceived-to-be-real causal relationship between two discrete issue areas."[24] For instance, we can say there is a substantive issue-linkage between climate change and health because, for example, climate change shifts areas where malarial mosquitos can live and breed, hence causally impacting on public health. Substantive issue-linkages differ from tactical issue-linkages, which occur when issues are combined in interstate negotiations through conditionality to facilitate bargaining. An example of a tactical issue-linkage is that developing states may make their pledges to

reduce greenhouse gas emissions dependent on whether donor states provide climate financing.

Substantive issue-linkages do not exist on their own accord—they must be established and actively promoted by actors who see a reason for linking two discrete issue areas. They are intersubjectively constituted and maintained by a range of international actors including: international organizations, international NGOs, and states. Intersubjectivity means that no single actor can on their own create a strong issue-linkage. Rather, the creation of strong substantive issue-linkages requires a consensus or agreement between a number of influential actors that there is a causal link between two discrete areas. A strong issue-linkage will be highly visible and widely supported by international actors in at least one of the two regimes being linked. The difference between a weak issue-linkage and a strong issue-linkage is often the presence of a successful epistemic community that endorses and promotes the issue-linkage.[25]

Strong issue-linkages cannot be reduced to a single indicator or criterion. It is difficult to measure the degree of institutional support and/or consensus behind a substantive issue-linkage. I use the following indicators in this book to identify when an issue-linkage becomes strong: a significant number of international NGOs and international organizations elaborating policy or advocacy material about an issue-linkage; high citations and circulation of literature substantiating the issue-linkage; presence of interagency working groups dedicated to the issue-linkage; and senior politicians who endorse the link. These indicators will be used in chapter two to identify when climate change becomes linked to development and migration respectively.

This conception of evolving issue-linkages stands in contrast to functionalist theories of "spillovers." Functionalists have highlighted how international organizations should be created to pursue specific technical tasks—such as coordinating trade or communications.[26] Neo-functionalists, building on this theory and the empirical success of the European Union (EU) common market, propose that interdependent economic interests create a demand for institutions to deliver cooperative outcomes in other areas.[27] Once regional economic institutions are created there is an inherent tendency for cooperation to "spill over" into other issue areas. For functionalists, cooperation on one issue between states will trigger further cooperation on other issues and leads to organizational expansion. This occurs as the nature of a problem evolves or the original problem that an international organization was created for is solved. However, functionalists consider international organizations as passive in this process: they are independent variables and organizational change is determined by exogenous factors.[28] I argue, and elaborate next, that international organizations are autonomous and play an active role in instigating and elaborating issue-linkages.

Staff perception of issue-linkage

The mere presence of an issue-linkage between a new issue and an organization's mandate does not entail that an organization will expand and engage with it. Staff perception of their mandate will shape if and how they respond. In making this argument, the book builds on sociological institutionalism and principal agent accounts which are often presented as competing approaches. Yet theorists in both traditions claim that bureaucrats in international organizations develop their own identities and preferences and, due to this, influence organizational behavior. I suggest that international bureaucrats will decide which issues are closely linked to their mandate and choose if and how to engage with them.

Principal agent scholars and sociological institutionalists agree that international organizations, staffed by international, professional bureaucrats, will develop preferences independently of member states.[29] These staff share a common professional identity, and will be loyal to their international organization as they depend on it for their job security and promotion. Independent professional bureaucrats will be dedicated to the "knowledge of problem-based aspects of the international organization's mission" and will create "epistemic communities."[30] Scholars differ on what factors shape staff decision to expand. Some highlight the role of culture, identity, and epistemic beliefs (namely sociological institutionalists) whereas others (many principal agent scholars) tend to focus on availability of resources or perception of states' reaction.

I suggest that staff will favor expansion if a new issue resonates with the core role and identity of an organization. International organizations will tend to expand in both size and scope as staff "try to square their rationalized abstractions of reality with facts on the ground."[31] This is because "conscientious bureaucrats very quickly recognize that to accomplish a great many ambitious social tasks they need to reach outside the narrow compartments in which we place them."[32] For expansion to occur staff need to perceive a strong issue-linkage between their core issue-area and the new issue-area. "[They] will be more receptive to new goals and more active in implementing them when they believe that these goals flow logically from the organization's own expert knowledge" than if they come from outside or are perceived to be tangential.[33]

Staff may not always favor expansion. This is because institutional action is based on "identifying the normatively appropriate behavior rather than calculating the return expected from alternative choices."[34] This is particularly true when organizations face novel and politically important scenarios.[35] Individuals in organizations will decide on a course of action based on their interpretation of existing norms and rules, rather than rationally calculating the cost-benefit return expected from their choices. Thus expansion will occur if international bureaucrats perceive that they should play a role in the new issue-area.[36] If a new issue arises organizations will ask: Does it fit with the existing tasks, identity, or culture of the organization?

This explanation contrasts with other accounts of staff preferences for expansion. Some scholars suggest that international bureaucrats will always seek to increase their organization's scope. International organizations (or agents) have fixed interests to maximize their budget, tasks, and autonomy, as they are "competence-maximizers."[37] Staff will favor expansion if it enables them greater autonomy. Other scholars have argued that international organizations behave like firms and pursue financing, thus their expansion is contingent on the presence of external material resources.[38] Expansion here is a logic for survival given that international organizations operate in an increasingly competitive marketplace. According to this view, espoused in resource dependency theory, we would expect international organizations to expand if there were resources available to do so.

In addition, scholars have suggested that international bureaucrats may base their decisions on their perception of member state support. Staff are likely to be very aware of their dependency on states and will avoid advocating policies or programs that might jeopardize their relationship with states. They may "restrain themselves and advocate preferences in line with their principals if they think it will keep their organization alive."[39] Equally, they may be wary of behavior that might undermine the legitimacy of their organization's mission.[40] This account of international organizations suggests that staff's perception of whether states will support it is an important determining factor of expansion. Resource flows, organizational autonomy and state preferences may also factor in bureaucrats' decisions to expand or not. However, this book stresses the primary importance of how international bureaucrats view new issues and their place within existing organizational mandates. In particular, it identifies how new issue-linkages emerge, and are constructed and interpreted by international bureaucrats. If staff see the issue as having a strong issue-linkage to their core mandate they are likely to engage, but if not they are unlikely to expand. This is an important contribution to our understanding of change in international organizations.

Studying mandate change

Mandates outline the responsibilities of an international organization, and are set by states. The founding documents—typically a charter, constitution, or statute—describe the core functions and purpose of an organization. The challenge for scholars is that mandates can and do evolve over time, and their parameters are somewhat ambiguous.[41] In this book I distinguish between the formal delegated mandate from member states and the scope of activities that an international organization performs, regardless of member states' support. To identify the formal mandate we need to look at the declarations of member states at the institution's decision-making body—the council, executive committee, or equivalent. If member states agree collectively to add a new task or issue to an organization's mandate then this constitutes mandate change.

It is not always easy to identify mandate change. An organization may expand autonomously into a new issue-area and states may not express any opposition or reprimand the organization. This occurs as member states rarely monitor every action, program, or policy of an international organization. However, it makes it hard to know if states are granting tacit consent, or whether they are simply unaware of mandate creep but would be opposed to it. To identify mandate change I look for evidence that states have been informed of an action at the organization's decision-making body (council, executive board, or equivalent) and have collectively agreed to support it. This is not the same as a few member states endorsing and financing an organization to perform a new task without support from the entire council. This model of individually contracting to an institution is becoming increasingly common with the bilateralization of many multilateral agencies.[42]

To examine if and how mandate change is occurring across three organizations I firstly examine the international organizations' original mandates. I also examine the evolution of each institution between its inception and 1990, and focus specifically on whether the organization had a mandate for working on environmental issues in the 1990–2000 period. The 1990s saw intense international attention on the environment—partly because of the 1992 Rio United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)—and new issue-linkages emerged between the environment and development, displacement, and migration. I show how member states had not mandated any of the

organizations to work on climate change. This sets a baseline for analyzing mandate change in the 2000s.

The substantive sections of each case study chapter trace the rhetorical, policy, structural, and operational changes that UNHCR, IOM, and UNDP made in response to climate change between 2000 and 2014. I look at these four dimensions of change in each organization, as mandate change is not just about what happens in the top decision-making body, but also what happens on the ground and in speeches, policies, and staffing decisions. In other words, it is a gradual, iterative process that is influenced by international bureaucrats. Each of the four dimensions highlights a different type of change.

Rhetorical change occurs when executive heads and/or senior management prioritize climate change in their speeches. This dimension charts how the leadership presents their organization's position on a new issue-area. Policy change occurs when an organization develops and publishes new policy statements specifically on an issue. It typically demonstrates a more in-depth engagement with an issue than rhetorical change, and can come from any department of the bureaucracy. Structural change indicates that an international institution has established new departments or positions to focus on climate change. This requires significant resourcing and indicates a more long-term commitment to working on an issue than a single policy statement or speech. Finally, operational change occurs when an organization develops and implements new projects or programs with a focus on climate change. It refers to the actual services that an international organization delivers and focuses on how statements, policies, and structural change at headquarters actually translate to action on the ground.

These four categories are useful to identify, analyze, and structure our analysis of organizational change, and could be used for other issues, or other organizations. The case study chapters examine the changes along these four dimensions and if and how they led to mandate change. They are loosely chronological, and use process tracing, to examine rhetoric, policy, structure, and operational changes. However they do not follow a blow-by-blow account of each change and on some occasions the changes are grouped together, as they are intertwined. These four dimensions can also be reinforcing: if structural change occurs it is more likely we will see other dimensions of change as staff are hired to pursue an issue.

Research design

So why focus on only these three organizations, UNHCR, UNDP, and IOM? Many social scientists would argue it would be best to study a much larger group to increase the generalizability of theorizing about organizational change. This study focuses on only three organizations because it aims to examine in-depth how organizations engage with a new issue-area, for which there is no preexisting scholarship. Furthermore, the data on international organizations' engagement with climate change does not easily lend itself to quantitative analysis. An approach some scholars might advocate is a quantitative study analyzing the proportion of an institution's budget dedicated to climate change initiatives. Such studies have been completed for the World Bank, which has a specific environmental budget,[43] although they have not been without critics.[44] However this approach would not work with other agencies as usually they have no specific budget allocation, and it is extremely difficult to identify what exactly a climate-related activity or initiative is. In many cases international organizations during the course of this study were still devising methods to separate out climate change activities from other existing work. For instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which tracks official development assistance, only began monitoring climate adaptation in 2010 and is still refining its measures. This study enriches our understanding of what counts as climate adaptation by looking at how international organizations have developed their work in this area.

Another alternative approach would be to study the evolving discourse of these international organizations and analyze the frequency, timing, and framing of climate change in their institutional texts. This approach has been followed by other scholars, in particular highlighting the security framing that many actors have used to link climate change to displacement.[45] However, a limitation of this approach is that it does not tell us if and how these discourses actually shape the practice of an international organization. Moreover, they tend to focus more on institutional headquarters, which issue most statements, speeches, and policy documents. Instead, this book traces organizational change from headquarters to operational activities on the ground. It seeks to provide a cross section of how international organizations engage with new issues and for this reason focuses on rhetoric, policy, structure, and operations. To complete such an in-depth analysis this book can focus on only three organizations.

For comparative purposes these organizations share a number of important similarities. Most importantly for the purposes of theorizing they are all intergovernmental organizations. This means they are created, funded, and mandated by states to perform particular tasks on their behalf. This is in marked contrast with NGOs, or businesses, which are private institutions, although they may act in the public good and have the autonomy to pursue their own agendas.[46] Although they vary in terms of voting procedures, regularity of board meetings, and their budgets, they are united in being organizations that operate for and on behalf of states, and several schools of international relations literature have been dedicated to explaining their actions.

Moreover, all three are international agencies with sizeable bureaucracies of between 6,500 and 8,500 staff. They are all served by international civil servants who must be loyal to their organization's mission rather than a particular national interest. They differ from other purely "forum" international organizations which are primarily to convene member states—think of the United Nations General Assembly, or various regional organizations such as the Organization for American States (OAS). They are not international secretariats, which assist states in the negotiation of international agreements, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat. Rather these three organizations all deliver services and have field offices in over one hundred countries around the world. The organizations examined here are thus united by the fact that they have a large body of international staff, which deliver projects in developing countries, and are based in the Global North.

Finally, all were created in the post–World War II era: UNHCR and IOM in 1951, and UNDP in 1965. Thus a similar length of time (approximately 60 years) has elapsed between their original mandates and the present day. This is important as the book examines how they have interpreted their evolving mandates. However, these three organizations are not a representative sample of the total population of international organizations.[47] They were selected because each of them was established to focus on a single issue-area (development, refugees, and migration) and not to work on climate change.

These organizations do differ in significant ways. UNDP is a UN program based in New York, UNHCR is a commissioner based in Geneva; and the IOM is outside the UN system (although headquartered in Geneva). They vary also in scope: UNDP has a broader, and thus more flexible mandate (development) than UNHCR (refugees). They also differ in terms of functions: UNDP and IOM are service-orientated organizations delivering projects, while UNHCR also offers states a forum to negotiate new agreements and norms on international protection for refugees, stateless, and other displaced peoples. These differences will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Sources and methods

To analyze organizational change at the rhetoric, policy, structural, and operational levels this book draws on a wide range of primary and secondary sources. I have built on the secondary literature of each organization's history and evolution, which is detailed in the case studies. I also analyzed all of the publicly available speeches, reports, policy papers, and executive committee proceedings relating to the issue of climate change in each of the three organizations. Analyzing these documents involved 1) identifying documents that mentioned climate change; 2) examining if and how the organization framed and justified its climate change work; 3) examining member states' support for climate change actions (in the case of executive reports); and 4) evaluating whether the document represented a qualitative change from previous statements, policies, and reports. The documents varied dramatically in type and scale: from four-page policy papers to one-hundred-fifty-page reports. It would have been problematic to compare them for the frequency of times they mentioned climate change or the strength of their justification for climate change action. There was thus no universal coding scheme used as it would have blurred important differences between reports rather than enabling the identification of the core documents and speeches in which rhetoric and policy evolved.

Secondly, I conducted semistructured interviews with over 150 officials from international organizations, member-states, and NGOs. These were conducted at: the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen (2009); the UNHCR and IOM headquarters in Geneva (March 2010); the UNDP headquarters (October 2010); field operations in Kenya (March–April 2011); and the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in Oslo (June 2011). Interviewing and observing international organizations at these various sites offered a much broader view of how they are adapting beyond their headquarters. The quality and quantity of these interviews offers in-depth insights into the decisions made and how these translated into action around the globe. Almost all interview participants are kept anonymous, in keeping with their wishes.

Kenya is a good site to analyze how development, migration, and refugee organizations are responding to climate change as it is one of the world's most drought-prone countries. In recent years drought has dried out pastures in northern Kenya, resulting in the deaths of cattle and devastating the primary livelihoods of Kenya's nomadic pastoralists. It also led to famine in Somalia, and thousands fled into Kenya to escape malnutrition, persecution, and ongoing conflict. In August 2009

Somalis were arriving into Dadaab, the world's largest refugee camp, at an "overwhelming average rate of 6,400 a month."[48] The president of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki, declared the drought and the resulting famine a national disaster.[49] The government explained that "10 million people are food insecure and require emergency support. These people will not be able to meet their minimum food requirements [without emergency measures]."[50] President Kibaki called on the international community to assist Kenya and launched an appeal for US$400 million in foreign aid. Drought and famine are not new to the Horn of Africa. However, the 2009 drought did exemplify the International Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) prediction of a world with more severe and frequent extreme weather events.[51]

It also represents a "hard case" for UN agencies to justify expansion into environmental and climate change activities. Kenya is the global headquarters of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and it has a large operational presence there. UNEP carries out environmental activities in partnership with, and on behalf of, other international organizations. Thus we might expect non-environmental organizations to partner with UNEP rather than expanding and developing new expertise in this area themselves. Yet all three case study organizations have established climate change adaptation projects in Kenya and showcased these at the UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen. By focusing on Kenya we can examine if and how organizations are beginning to respond to climate change on the ground.

I identified interview participants in Kenya, Geneva, New York, and elsewhere according to their role in the three case study international organizations. I sought to interview those who worked specifically on climate change initiatives as well as senior managers with an overview of the organization. I also interviewed diplomats that were involved in executive committee deliberations, in monitoring and/or funding international organizations. I talked with a range of staff from partner organizations—international organizations and NGOs—who worked with the case study international organizations on climate change. Participants were found through a combination of the "snowball" sampling and directly contacting embassies and organizations for interviews. I also had regular telephone and in-person interviews with government and UN officials to keep abreast of policy developments and gain insights into operational change globally. These interviews helped to identify key changes in rhetoric, policy, structure, and operations; to contextualize primary and secondary literature; and to provide the institutional backstory of if and how these organizations pursued mandate change.

There were some limitations in this data collection. I was not able to formally interview current or previous heads of UNHCR, UNDP, or IOM, except for James Speth (administrator of UNDP, 1993–1999). My analysis of these leaders' motivations and perceptions is based on discussions with staff that have had close interaction with them. Interviews were temporally biased towards the 2009 to 2013 period when I conducted the bulk of interviews. I addressed this bias by talking with former staff from each international organization to gain insights into earlier periods. My analysis of member state and international organization relations for these earlier periods draws on executive committee reports and documents available online and the institutional memory of staff present.

To deepen my analysis of organizational change I also conducted participant observation at the various field site locations.[52] Participant observation is a process of collecting data by participating in and observing everyday life from the inside and is rarely used in international relations.[53] I used participant observation as a method of data generation and contextualization rather than seeking to create full organizational ethnographies. At the UNFCCC I observed where, how, and to whom each organization presented its climate change agenda. In Kenya I spent ten days based in Kakuma and two days in the Dadaab refugee camps and several weeks in Nairobi in 2011. I visited project sites in the refugee camps and in the surrounding areas, talked and shared meals and leisure time with IOM and UNHCR staff and, to a lesser extent, with beneficiaries in the refugee and host community. This work was crucial to understanding if and how international organization operations were changing on the ground. I sought rich detailed accounts of international organization change that went beyond formal interviews with bureaucrats and policy documentation, which are often the dominant data sources for international relations scholars of international organizations.

Structure of the book

This subsequent chapter traces how climate change became linked to development, migration, and displacement. It begins by looking at the emergence of adaptation in the UNFCCC negotiations in the 2000s. The broadening of the focus from mitigation to adaptation enabled a host of new actors to forge issue-linkages with climate change. The chapter's core contribution is to examine how civil society, academics, and epistemic communities established links between climate change and migration, and climate change and development. It examines the evolution of these issue-linkages which are now often taken for granted yet form the rationale for development, migration, and refugee organizations' engagement with climate change. The subsequent three chapters then explore how and why UNHCR, IOM, and UNDP integrated climate change into their rhetoric, policy, structure, and operations. Each chapter examines the evolving mandate of the organization, before concentrating on its engagement with climate change (2000–2015).

The third chapter traces how High Commissioner António Guterres sought a role for UNHCR in climate change and displacement. It contrasts this with the resistance of many staff and states that were concerned engagement with climate displacement would undermine the office's role in refugee protection. It demonstrates how policy and rhetoric on climate change took off at the global level in 2008–2010 but not in operations on the ground in Kenya, despite severe drought. The chapter emphasizes that UNHCR was initially resistant to engaging with climate change, but then from 2010 onwards sought to carve out a new protection role and build on its existing protection role for refugees and on humanitarian work with internally displaced peoples.

The subsequent chapter examines how IOM engaged in the 1990s with the environment and migration, and in the mid-2000s this work evolved into climate change and migration. The office researched and wrote reports on the issue, advocated for an interagency standing committee on climate migration, and initiated 500 new climate change related projects, including in Kenya. It suggests that IOM staff pursued new financing opportunities as they saw no conflict with IOM's core mandate, even though it had little expertise in adaptation.

The fifth chapter finds that UNDP expanded into environmental issues in the 1990s through its work on sustainable human development, and with multilateral financing from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). In the mid-2000s it became one of the main agencies in the UN system developing climate change adaptation policies and operations, with a large portfolio backed by a substantial grant from the Japanese government and multilateral financing. UNDP staff also highlighted the impacts of climate change for development in various Human Development Reports. Most UNDP staff saw no conflict between UNDP's development mandate and work on climate adaptation, and drove expansion. However, it was only in the late 2000s that member states granted UNDP an explicit mandate to work on climate change adaptation.

The conclusion highlights the role of staff in driving changes when they saw clear, strong issue-linkages between their mandates and climate change. It also shows that states set some important parameters for organizational change and expansion. Finally, it draws out the broader implications of this work for global governance. It suggests that climate change governance is much broader than commonly conceptualized, and scholars should investigate how a range of institutions which are not obviously environmental have engaged with the regime. It encourages scholars to examine if and when organizations are effective when working in new issue-areas. This book has important policy implications as we look to these global institutions to resolve twenty-first century problems.

Conclusion

This book focuses on three institutions: the UNHCR, the UNDP, and IOM. All three were designed in the post–World War II era in response to the devastating effects of war, and none was given a mandate for climate change or environmental issues. This book traces their responses to climate change in their rhetoric, policy, structure, operations, and overall mandate change. This book suggests that international bureaucrats can play a decisive role in deciding whether and how to expand into a new issue-area. The next five chapters make a critical contribution by illustrating how international organizations forge, frame, and internalize new issue-linkages and use these to advocate for expansion. The book helps us to understand how institutions established in the twentieth century are adapting to a twenty-first century world.

Notes

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